The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics [1] [2] [3] [4] . So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics [1] [2] [3] [4] . So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons 5 . Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of offthe-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by identifying and patching technological deficiencies.
The field of quantum key distribution has evolved rapidly in the last decades. Today QKD implementations in laboratories can generate key over fibre channels with lengths up to 250 km 6 and a few QKD systems are even commercially available promising enhanced security for data communication.
In all proofs for the security of QKD there are assumptions on the devices involved. However the components used for the experimental realizations of QKD deviate from the models in the security proofs. This has led to iterations where security threats caused by deviations have been discovered, and the loopholes have been closed either by modification of the implementation, or more general security proofs [7] [8] [9] . In other cases, information leaking to the eavesdropper was quantified 10, 11 . Attacks exploiting the most severe loopholes are usually experimentally unfeasible with current technology. A prominent example is the photon number splitting a) Electronic mail: lars.lydersen@iet.ntnu.no attack 12 which requires the eavesdropper Eve to perform a quantum non-demolition measurement of the photon number sent by Alice. The attack is still unfeasible, and has been outruled by improved QKD protocols 13, 14 . In contrast, a more implementation-friendly attack is the time-shift attack 15 based on detector efficiency mismatch 16 . Experimentally however, this attack has only given a small information-theoretical advantage for Eve when applied to a modified version of a commercial QKD system 17 . In the attack Eve captured partial information about the key in 4% of her attempts, such that she could improve her random (brute-force) search over all possible keys.
In this Letter, we demonstrate how two commercial QKD systems id3110 Clavis2 and QPN 5505, from the commercial vendors ID Quantique and MagiQ Technologies, can be fully cracked. We show experimentally that Eve can blind the gated detectors in the QKD systems using bright illumination, thereby converting them into classical, linear detectors. The detectors are then fully controlled by classical laser pulses superimposed over the bright continuous-wave (CW) illumination. Remarkably the detectors exactly measure what is dictated by Eve; with matching measurement bases Bob detects exactly the bit value sent by Eve, while with incompatible bases the bit is undetected by Bob. Even the detectors dark counts are completely eliminated (but can be simulated at will by Eve). Based on these experimental results we propose in detail how Eve can attack the systems with off-the-shelf components, obtaining a perfect copy of the raw key without leaving any trace of her presence.
Today most QKD systems use avalanche photo diodes (APDs) to detect single photons 18 . To detect single photons APDs are operated in Geiger mode (see Fig. 1 ). However all APDs spend part of the time being biased under the breakdown voltage, in the linear mode. During this time the detector remains sensitive to bright light with a classical optical power threshold P th . If Eve has access to the APDs in the linear mode, she may eavesdrop on the QKD system with an intercept-resend (fakedstate 19, 20 ) attack as follows: Eve uses a copy of Bob to de- Afterwards VAPD is lowered below V br to quench the avalanche, before returning to Geiger mode. Below V br , in the linear mode, the current IAPD is proportional to the incident optical power Popt. Then I th becomes an optical power threshold P th . b) The commercial systems use gated detectors, with the APDs in Geiger mode only when a photon is expected, to reduce false detections called dark counts. In practice, the APD is biased just below V br , and periodical ∼3 V voltage pulses create Geiger mode time regions, so-called gates. c) In both systems, the bias high-voltage supply VHV has impedance R bias (R bias = 1 kΩ in Clavis2 and 20 kΩ in QPN 5505) before V bias is applied to the APD at the point T1. Therefore, any current through R bias reduces V bias (see Supplementary information section I for more details).
tect the states from Alice in a random basis. Eve resends her detection results, but instead of sending pulses at the single photon level she sends bright trigger pulses, with peak power just above P th . Bob will only have a detection event if his active basis choice coincides with Eve's basis choice (see Fig. 2 ), otherwise no detector clicks. This causes half of the bits to be lost, but in practice this is not a problem because transmittance from the output of Alice to Bob's detectors is much lower than 1/2. Also Bob's APDs rarely have a quantum efficiency over 50%, while the trigger pulses always cause clicks. For a Bob using passive basis choice, Eve launches the peak power just above 2P th since half of the power hits the conjugate basis detectors 20, 21 . Then Bob's detector always clicks.
After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve have identical bit values and basis choices. Since Alice and Bob communicate openly during sifting, error correction and 14 and decoy-state BB84
13 protocols as well as the normal BB84 protocol 4 . With suitable modifications it applies to differential phase shift (DPS) 23 , and given the right set of detector parameters to coherent one-way (COW) 24 protocols.
Note that the threshold P th should be sufficiently well defined for perfect eavesdropping. To be precise, let detector i always click from a trigger pulse of optical peak power ≥ P always,i , and never click from a trigger pulse of optical peak power ≤ P never,i . The requirement for Eve to be able to make any single detector click while none of the other detectors click, can be expressed in terms of the click thresholds as
When eavesdropping, simply applying trigger pulses between the gates populates carrier trap levels in the APD, thus raising the dark count probability and causing a too high quantum bit error rate (QBER). To avoid this Bob's detectors were blinded 20, 22 . Then the detectors are insensitive to single photons and have no dark counts. Detector 0 is blind (dark count rate exactly zero) at P laser > 397 µW and detector 1 is blind at P laser > 765 µW. QPN 5505 has similar characteristics; due to larger value of R bias , its detector 0 goes blind at P laser > 60 µW and detector 1 goes blind at P laser > 85 µW (see Supplementary information section II for more details of QPN 5505 blinding).
Outside the gates the APD is biased below the breakdown voltage, and the current caused by illuminating the APD is increasing with respect to the incident optical power. A current through the APD will decrease the bias voltage over the APD due to the presence of R bias (see Fig. 1c ) and the internal resistance of the APD. Fig. 3 shows the bias voltage drop at the point T1 in Clavis2 under CW illumination. The blinding is caused by the drop of V bias such that the APD never operates in the Geiger mode, but rather is a classical photo diode at all times. The voltages V HV,0/1 of the high voltage supplies do not change; the entire change of V bias is due to the resistors R bias . Although shorting this resistor seems like an easy countermeasure, at least for Clavis2 this does not prevent blinding. With higher illumination the electrical power dissipated in the APD generates substantial heat. Raised APD temperature increases its breakdown voltage by about 0.1 V/
• C while V bias remains constant, which also leads to blinding (at several times higher power level, 4-10 mW).
To demonstrate detector control in Clavis2, each detector was blinded with 1.08 mW optical power with a 2.5 ns long trigger pulse superimposed slightly after the gate. Note that a shorter trigger pulse can be timed inside the gate. Fig. 4a shows the response of detector 0 in Clavis2 to trigger pulses at the click thresholds.
Similarly for the QPN 5505 the trigger pulse was timed with its leading edge about 5 ns after the gate. Figure 4b shows the click thresholds for the detectors when blinded with 100-300 µW CW blinding illumination. In this case, for blinding power levels 100-250 µW the detectors remain silent at a power level of ≤ 0.61 · P always,1 .
For both systems the click thresholds fulfill equation (1), hence perfect eavesdropping is possible.
Both systems under investigation operate according to . 4 . Detector control. a) Electrical and optical signal oscillograms when detector 0 in Clavis2 is blinded by 1.08 mW CW illumination, and controlled by a superimposed 2.5 ns long laser pulse timed slightly behind the gate (see Supplementary information section III for detailed measurement setup). The superimposed Pnever,0 = 647 µW (detector 1: Pnever,1 = 697µW) trigger pulse never causes a detection event while the P always,0 = 808 µW (P always,1 = 932 µW) trigger pulse always causes a detection event. b) Click thresholds versus the applied CW blinding illumination for the QPN 5505. When the blinding power increases, P always,0 diverges, perhaps because the bias voltage is approaching the punchthrough voltage of the APD (see Supplementary information section II).
the plug-and-play principle 25 which allows an easily installable plug-and-play eavesdropper (see Fig. 5 ).
A full eavesdropper based on bright-light detector control has previously been implemented and tested under realistic conditions on a 290 m experimental entanglement-based QKD system 21 . Since the attack is clearly implementable, building a full eavesdropper for a commercial cryptosystem would not further expose the problem. A better use of effort is to concentrate on thoroughly closing the vulnerability. An optical power meter In the plug-and-play scheme 25 the laser pulses travel from Bob to Alice and back to Bob, passing Bob's interferometer twice. Therefore, polarization drift in the fibre and drift in Bob's interferometer is automatically compensated. Eve consists of copies of Alice (Alice ′ ) and Bob (Bob ′ ) which share bit and basis settings, a blinding laser, and an optical amplifier used to get the proper trigger pulse power. Due to the plug-and-play principle any environmental perturbations in the fibres Alice-Bob ′ and Alice ′ -Bob are automatically compensated. See Supplementary information section IV for a more detailed scheme.
at Bob's entrance with a classical threshold seems like an adequate countermeasure to prevent blinding. However, the power meter output should be included into a security proof. Further, the click threshold at the transition between linear and Geiger mode may be very low, allowing practically non-detectable control pulses. How to design hack-proof detectors is unclear to us at this stage, and all future detectors clearly must be tested for side-channels.
We believe that openly discovering and closing security loopholes is a necessary step towards practical secure QKD, as it has been for multiple security technologies before. For example, RSA public key cryptography has received extensive scrutiny which in the past discovered effective attacks based on implementation loopholes 26 . In our view quantum hacking is an indication of the mature state of QKD rather than its insecurity. Rather than demonstrating that practical QKD cannot become provably secure 27 , our findings clearly show the necessity of investigating the practical security of QKD: Any large loopholes must be eliminated, and remaining imperfections must be incorporated into security proofs.
Both ID Quantique and MagiQ Technologies have been notified about the loophole prior to this publication. ID Quantique has implemented countermeasures. According to MagiQ Technologies the system QPN 5505 is discontinued; newer models of their system have not been available for our testing. knowledged. L.L. and V.M. thank the Group of Applied Physics at the University of Geneva, ID Quantique, and armasuisse Science and Technology for their hospitality, discussions, cooperativeness and loan of equipment. Service of Radiology of the Cantonal Hospital of Geneva is thanked for a quick help in revealing internal layers in a multilayer printed circuit board of a commercial detector. 
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